SADC Countries: Country Exports as a Share of Total Exports (in per cent) ...36 Table 5 SADC The recent interest in assessing the consequences of monetary integration in southern Africa stems from several factors. First, it is an outgrowth of a movement towards increased solidarity in Africa more generally (Cobham and Robson, 1994:286; Masson and Pattillo, 2004:10) 2 . An African monetary union is sometimes seen as a symbol of strength, and some of its proponents hope that it will help provide support for political integration 3 . One consequence of the formation of regional currency blocs in Africa, so the argument goes, is that they could culminate in a pan-African monetary union. Second, the experience of the European monetary union, which is perceived to have been beneficial for its members, has stimulated interest in monetary unions in regions outside Europe, including Africa (Masson and Pattillo, 2005:34; Jefferis, 2007:83) 4 . Third, recent academic work on the benefits and costs of single-currency areas suggests that the adoption of a common currency can improve the structural characteristics of the economies concerned, increasing trade integration and business-cycle correlation, and enhancing the credibility of macroeconomic policies (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Rose, 2000) . The upshot of this recent literature is that the cost-benefit calculus used to determine currency-area participation becomes more favourable after a country has joined a currency union 1 A literature dealing with the possibility of monetary unions in other parts of Africa has also emerged. See, for example, Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo (2005) and Houssa (2007) , who deal with monetary union in western Africa, and Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2005) , who deal with monetary arrangements in the CFA Franc Zone. 2 The African Union, a pan-African organisation the Constitutive Act of which entered into force in 2001, set the goal of a single currency in Africa by the year 2021. 3 Jefferis (2007:93) noted that interest in an African monetary union reflects, in part, the view that the African Union "would be taken more seriously in global terms if it represented a more unified powerful economic bloc". For a skeptical view of the connection between monetary union and political union in Africa, see Masson and Pattillo (2005:34 -35) . 4 See Hochreiter and Tavlas (2007) , and the articles contained therein, for discussions of regional currency blocs. than before; therefore, the creation of a monetary union can itself create conditions that are favourable for the well-functioning of the union (De Grauwe, 2007:27) .
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes present exchange rate arrangements of the economies in southern Africa and briefly discusses key characteristics of these economies. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the traditional approach (under which economic structures are assumed to remain unaltered following entry into a monetary union) that has been used to assess the benefits and costs of a common currency, and the endogenous approach (under which economic structures are assumed to change following entry into monetary union) dealing with currency-area participation, respectively. Section 3 begins with a discussion of some analytical aspects of monetary unions, including a presentation of the traditional criteria used to judge the appropriateness of a country's participation in a monetary union. It then critically reviews the recent empirical literature on the benefits and costs of a common currency, in terms of the traditional criteria, in southern Africa. Section 4 begins with a discussion of recent analytic literature dealing with the endogeneity of economic structures following entry into a monetary union. It then reviews those studies that have dealt with this issue in the southern African context. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the recent literature for monetary unions among southern African economies.
2

Present arrangements: Basic features
The countries that have constituted the main area of focus of empirical work on monetary integration in southern Africa are the 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the combined population of which is about 245 million people (see Table 1 ) 5 . Established in 1992, the SADC's goal initially was to form a common market. Subsequently, the SADC included monetary integration as an objective and, at a meeting of its central bank governors in February 2005, proposed the following: (1) A monetary union, involving irrevocably fixed exchange 5 In recent years, there have been several changes in the composition of SADC membership. Seychelles had been a member but withdrew from the organisation in 2004 while Madagascar joined in 2005. Consequently, some of the empirical studies reviewed below include Seychelles, but not Madagascar, in the sample of countries considered. As discussed below, some studies consider subgroups of SADC economies.
rates among the participating currencies, co-ordination of monetary policies, and full capital-account convertibility; and (2) a common SADC currency and a regional SADC central bank for the year 2018.
As shown in Table 1 , SADC members employ a variety of exchange rate arrangements. A key feature of these arrangements is the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The CMA is a fixed-exchange-rate arrangement that groups four countries:
South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland 6 . Under the terms of the CMA Agreement, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland issue national currencies -the loti (introduced in 1980), the Namibian dollar (introduced in 1993), and the lilangeni (introduced in 1974), respectively. Those currencies have been pegged (at a par) to the South African rand since their introduction. In addition, the rand is legal tender in each of the other three countries. However, none of the three currencies is legal tender in South Africa. Since the rand is legal tender in the other three countries, South Africa compensates each of the countries for foregone seigniorage 7 . With the other CMA currencies pegged to the rand, the South African monetary authorities follow a floating exchange rate arrangement for the rand against other currencies.
Monetary policy for the CMA countries is set by the South African Reserve Bank based on domestic (South African) objectives 8 .
Most of the other SADC countries have exchange-rate arrangements that are classified independently (i.e. freely) floating or managed floating (see Table 1) 9 .
There are two exceptions: Botswana, the currency (the pula) of which is pegged to a basket comprising (with unannounced weights) the South African rand and the SDR, and Zimbabwe, which has a dual exchange rate system and a non-convertible currency (the Zimbabwe dollar). Each of the SADC countries has (to varying degrees) controls on capital movements (see Table 1 ). 6 The CMA originated as an informal arrangement during the colonial period in the early twentieth century. A currency union was formally established with the signing of the Rand Monetary Area Agreement (RMA) in 1974 by South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland, but Botswana withdrew in 1975. That agreement was revised in April 1986 to establish the CMA of Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. Namibia, which became independent in 1990, joined the CMA in 1992. 7 Compensation is based on a formula equal to the product of (1) two-thirds on the annual yield of the most recently issued long-term South African government bond, and (2) the volume of rand estimated to be in circulation in the member country concerned. 8 In February 2000, the South African Reserve Bank adopted a formal inflation-targeting framework. 9 Classifications are based on the IMF's Exchange-Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
Selected macroeconomic indicators of the SADC economies are presented in Table   2 , and trade indicators are presented in Tables 3 and 4 . These indicators merit several comments. First, SADC economies differ markedly in size and structure (see Table 2 ). South Africa, by far the largest economy (accounting for about 67 per cent of total SADC GDP and around 95 per cent of CMA GDP), is relatively industrialised and diversified while most of the other economies are small and undiversified, with a dependence on a narrow range of commodity exports (see Table 3 ). Second, the composition of exports varies considerably among the countries, and the prices of these exports frequently do not move closely together (Masson and Pattillo, 2005:37) . As reported in Table 3 , the share of total exports comprised by the three major export commodities of the SADC countries is typically in the range of 70 to 90 per cent. Third, as is the case with African economies more generally, SADC countries tend to report very low shares of intra-regional trade; intra-SADC exports are typically less than 40 per cent of each country's total exports (see Table 4 ).
Factors contributing to the low shares of intra-SADC trade include the following: (i)
Low per capita income levels, resulting in internal markets of limited sizes; (ii) the concentration of most countries on primary-commodity exports; (iii) limited transportation facilities and large distances between population centres; and (iv) relatively high shares of informal trade because of permeable borders (Boughton, 1993; Cobham and Robson, 1994; Masson and Pattillo, 2005) . As reported in Table   4 , the intra-trade (i.e., export) shares among SADC countries are considerably below the corresponding shares among euro area countries; the latter shares are generally in the range of 50 to 70 per cent. Fourth, although intra-trade among SADC countries is relatively small, an exception to this general pattern concerns bilateral trade between South Africa and its SADC partners (see Table 4 ). Many SADC countries, particularly those in the CMA, have large shares of both exports and imports with South Africa. Thus, intra-trade shares excluding South Africa are below 12 per cent for each of the countries reported in Table 4 . Fifth, most of South Africa's exports and imports are with non-African countries; as reported in Table 4 , South Africa's exports to other SADC countries comprise less than 10 per cent of South Africa's total exports.
As mentioned above, the SADC has set a goal for the adoption of a common currency for 2018. In this regard, the central bank governors of the organisation laid down a strategy for monetary union similar to the approach adopted by the European monetary union. The approach is based on two principles (De Grauwe, 2007:143) .
First, the transition towards monetary union should be a gradual one, extending over many years. Specifically, at their meeting in Tanzania fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio below 5 per cent by 2008; (3) public debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 per cent (no specific year stipulated); (4) current-account deficit-to-GDP ratio not greater than 9 per cent (no specific year stipulated); and (5) real GDP growth rate of not less than 7 per cent (no specific year stipulated).
Each country's outcomes with respect to these convergence criteria are reported in convergence criteria thought necessary (by the Governors of the SADC central banks) to achieve regional monetary integration; some countries, the case of Zimbabwe being a prominent example, appear to be many years away from satisfying the convergence criteria.
The above convergence criteria deal with the short-term economic performances of the countries concerned. Whether the SADC countries would benefit from a common currency requires an analysis of structural characteristics of those countries, an analysis to which we now turn.
3
Benefits and costs of monetary union in southern Africa:
Traditional approach
Analytical considerations
In an endeavour to determine whether members of the SADC would benefit, on net, from adopting a common currency, most of the recent empirical literature on this issue has focused on the capacity of the countries concerned to satisfy optimumcurrency-area (OCA) criteria. An OCA can be thought of as an "optimum" geographic domain in which a group of countries either shares a common currency or maintains separate national currencies with permanently fixed exchange rates among these currencies and full convertibility of the respective currencies into one another.
Optimality is typically judged on the basis of the ability of the members of the currency area to maintain external equilibrium without domestic unemployment but with domestic price stability (Mundell, 1961) 11 .
10 Committee of Central Bank Governors of SADC (June 2007). 11 For reviews of the OCA literature, see Tavlas (1993) and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) . Dellas and Tavlas (2005) assessed the effects of asymmetries in the degree of labour mobility among the members of a monetary union. They found that, in terms of the benefits of monetary union, asymmetries among economies matter. Economies with relatively flexible wages lose (in terms of macroeconomic volatility and welfare) when they join a monetary union with economies with relatively rigid wages. Kenen's (1969) thesis that more diversified economies are better candidates for OCA membership than lessdiversified economies since the diversification provides some insulation against a variety of shocks, forestalling the necessity of frequent changes in the terms of trade via the exchange rate.
In the traditional OCA literature, the main benefits of a monetary union derive from the elimination of the transaction costs of exchanging currencies and the elimination of exchange rate volatility, the latter of which is thought to decrease cross-border trade and investment. Additionally, the adoption of a single currency eliminates the need of firms to maintain staff to look after exchange rates in the area.
Economies of scale to be derived from the move to monetary integration include those associated with the following: The enlargement of the foreign-exchange market, decreasing both the volatility of prices and the ability of speculators to influence prices and, thus, to disrupt the conduct of monetary policy; the elimination 12 Labour mobility is a partial substitute because such mobility is usually low in the short run.
of the need of reserves for intra-area transactions and, to the extent that exchange rate parities are truly immutable, the elimination of the need of reserves to offset the effects of speculative capital flows in the area; the possible economising of reserves since, if members are structurally diverse, any payments imbalances may be offsetting; and, the improved allocational efficiency of financing to the extent that it provides both borrowers and lenders with a broader spectrum of financial instruments, enabling borrowers, lenders and equity investors to make more efficient choices in terms of duration and risk (Robson, 1987:140; Tavlas, 1993 Empirical researchers dealing with common-currency-area formation face the problem that there is no single, overriding criterion that can be used to judge the desirability and/or viability of a monetary union. Moreover, reliable data on some of the key OCA criteria, such as the degree of labour mobility among countries and the degrees of wage and price flexibility, are often difficult to obtain 13 . Therefore, much of the empirical literature dealing with the traditional criteria (which assumes that a country's structural characteristics remain unaltered following entry into a monetary union) has focused on three areas: (1) Analysis of the nature of shocks affecting the economies considered; (2) assessment of the degree of correlations of movements of real exchange rates and/or the terms-of-trade among the economies; and (3) analysis of co-movements in cyclical real growth rates among the economies. A reason for focusing on each of these three areas is the presumption that countries facing a high degree of symmetry of shocks and/or high correlations of cyclical movements of real output and/or real exchange rates do not need country-specific monetary and exchange rate policies. An additional rationale for studying shock-13 With regard to labour mobility, Boughton (1993:277) noted that, although such mobility in Africa appears to be circumscribed by that large distances between population centers and a limited availability of transportation, there has nevertheless been a long history of intra-regional migration of absorption and movements in exchange rates is that each is thought to combine the net influences of several of the criteria (Vaubel, 1978; Masson and Taylor, 1992) .
Recent work on a monetary union in southern Africa has followed the direction of the literature, focusing on these three areas.
Empirical approaches
In what follows, the empirical methodologies of ten studies dealing with monetary unification in southern Africa are considered, and the main thrust of the empirical results is presented and analysed. A summary of the basic components and the main findings of recent studies is provided in Table 6 14 . Studies differ in terms of the empirical methodologies used, countries considered, dependent and conditioning Table 6 provides information on 14 studies as follows. (1) Authors of nine of the studies (discussed in this section) dealt with only the traditional OCA criteria (i.e., they assume that a country's characteristics remain unaltered following entry into monetary union). (2) Authors of three studies dealt with only the newer endogenous OCA thesis (discussed in the next section). (3) The co-authors of one study deal with both approaches. (4) Finally, a study by Jenkins and Thomas (1997) assessed the degree of economic convergence among 12 SADC countries, under the (plausible) presumption that real economic convergence is necessary for co-ordination of exchange rate policy. As the focus of those authors differs from the other studies discussed in this paper, their results are discussed here. The authors found no evidence of convergence of per capita income of the 12 countries considered over the period 1960 -90. An implication of this finding is that the 12 countries considered are not ready for monetary integration. Jenkins and Thomas (1997) also found, however, that there has been marked convergence among Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland, indicating that those five countries could form a monetary union.
considers the degree of trade integration. In the cases of those authors who also consider countries in other regions of Africa, the following discussion focuses only on the results that pertain to monetary union in Southern Africa.
Correlations of output growth rates. Studies that report correlations of real
per capita growth rates aim to provide information on underlying shocks, the idea being that, apart from the impact of trend, movements in output are driven mainly by shocks. That is, studies in this genre assume that cyclical movements in output are primarily the result of shocks. An initial attempt to measure correlations of per capita output growth was made by Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) . These authors calculated bilateral correlations of growth rates for 11 southern African economies over the 
Correlations of output shocks.
To deal with the foregoing limitation, some authors used econometric methods to extract (i.e., separate) the underlying disturbances from real output. Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) , Yehoue (2005) , and Wang, Masha, Shirono, and Harris (hereafter Wang et al.) (2006) employed a three-step autoregressive estimation procedure 16 . In the first step, the growth of per capita GDP was regressed on its own first and second lags 17 . In the second step, the underlying disturbances were calculated using the regression residuals (or a measure of the residuals, such as the standard deviation of the residuals). In the third step, authors While the foregoing autoregressive approach helps to separate the underlying shocks from the data, it does not identify separate demand and supply shocks. To address this problem, Buigut (2006) and Buigut and Valev (2006) used a two-step statistical methodology developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to extract underlying demand and supply shocks from GDP data 18 . In the first step, the authors estimated vector autoregressions using the variables of interest. In the second step, these authors identified demand and supply shocks by assuming that demand shocks were temporary while the supply shocks were permanent. They extracted demand and supply shocks for all the prospective members of the monetary union and computed the correlations of the demand and supply shocks, respectively. The idea underlying the exercise is that asymmetric supply shocks are likely to continue after monetary unification (since such shocks have a structural character) while asymmetric demand shocks are likely to diminish (since they are partly policy induced). That is, since a monetary union involves a single monetary policy among the members, asymmetric demand shocks among members arising from differences in national monetary policies will be eliminated in a monetary union. Countries that are confronted with relatively large asymmetric supply shocks are not likely to be good candidates for a monetary union. Buigut and Valev (2006) Studies by Grandes (2003) and Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) used more elaborate statistical methodologies in dealing with correlations of exchange rates than the three sets of authors above. Using monthly data over the period 1990:1 -2001:4 for Botswana and the four CMA countries, Grandes tested for cointegration among bilateral real exchange rates, using the rand as the base currency. Under Grandes'
set-up, the four bilateral rates were tested for cointegration in vectors containing each of the remaining bilateral rates. If the relationships were stationary, the author inferred that the real exchange rates exhibited common trends. Consequently, a finding of stationarity meant that the countries had been subjected to symmetric shocks.
scussed below. Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) (3) They used the squares of these unanticipated residuals as measures of underlying shocks. Khamfula and Huizinga (2004:702) countries, Yehoue used South Africa as the anchor of the monetary union (i.e., to initiate the dynamic game).
3.3
The empirical evidence (2006) , who also used second-order autoregressive processes to extract shocks?
The latter two studies calculated correlations of shocks to real per capita GDP growth. Yehoue, however, estimated autoregressive equations for levels of real GDP, which might be expected to show higher degrees of co-movements than per capita GDP growth. His results were generally supportive of the hypothesis that a monetary union among the entire group of SADC economies is feasible. Yehoue's results, however, did not account for the non-stationarity that is typically present in output data expressed in levels. Thus, his results may have reflected specification errors arising from non-stationarity.
As noted above, authors that use autoregressive methods to extract shocks from the data are not able to decompose shocks into their respective supply and demand components. Consequently, the finding of weak co-movements of shocks in studies using autoregressive methods may reflect a predominance of asymmetric demand shocks, which may be policy-induced. Buigut and Valev (2006) , using the Blanchard- In their study of ten SADC countries, Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) obtained results supporting a five-member monetary union. As noted, Khamfula and Huizinga estimated unanticipated components among bilateral real exchange rates using both monthly and quarterly frequencies; the authors referred to their results using monthly data as the "short-run case" and the results using quarterly data as the "long-run case". Both sets of results provided support for a monetary union involving Mauritius, Malawi, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
To summarise the findings discussed thus far, most authors either (1) The findings by Yehoue (2005) and Jefferis (2007) warrant the following comments.
(1) In setting up a dynamic game, under which countries would want to join a monetary union if their trade shares (relative to GDP) exceeded a pre-specified threshold, Yehoue assumed a trade-share threshold of two per cent of GDP.
Countries that had trade shares with the monetary union in excess of two per cent would want to join the union. The two-per-cent threshold, however, appears to be low, arbitrary, and asymmetric 24 . It is asymmetric because it considers only the possible benefits to the countries that are outside the monetary union. In his game, there was no threshold for the countries inside the union. In other words, the author did not specify welfare criteria that could motivate countries inside the union to accept new entrants. Thus, both the low level of the threshold and the asymmetric nature of the game were conducive to the formation of large monetary unions. (2) Jefferis (2007) did not provide a formal analysis of the sets of data that he considered. His inference of an eight-member "convergence club" appears to be based on a casual inspection of the data 25 .
4
Endogenous OCA analysis
Whereas earlier work on OCAs sought to identify the characteristics that an economy should satisfy prior to joining a monetary union (i.e., ex ante), the "new" theory of OCAs has focused on changes in economic structure and performance that may result from participation in a monetary union (i.e., ex post) 26 . Endogenous OCA theory has identified two main transmission channels through which a common currency may affect an economy's performance. These channels operate via increased trade integration and enhanced credibility.
Trade integration. Greater trade integration is thought to increase growth by
increasing allocative efficiency and accelerating the transfer of knowledge.
Endogenous OCA theory posits that a common currency (as opposed to separate currencies tied together with fixed exchange rates) can promote trade and growth.
The basic intuition underlying this hypothesis is that a set of national currencies is a 24 Yehoue (2005:9) referred to the arbitrary nature of the two-per-cent cut-off. He justified it by arguing that, in a similar study, Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002) had used an arbitrary cut-off. The latter authors used a six-per-cent cut-off. 25 The author did not define what he meant by a "convergence club". 26 Endogenous OCA analysis leads to the view that an economy that fails to satisfy OCA criteria prior to entry into a monetary union may, nevertheless, satisfy the criteria as a result of entry into a monetary union (see Frankel and Rose, 1998) . Unlike the earlier OCA theory, which did not distinguish between a rigidly-pegged exchange-rate regime and monetary unification, the new OCA framework stresses the potential benefits of a monetary union.
significant barrier to trade. According to this view, in addition to removing the costs of currency conversion, a single currency and a common monetary policy preclude future competitive devaluations, facilitate foreign direct and portfolio investment, and the building of long-term relationships, and might (over time) encourage forms of political integration within the union. These outcomes would, in turn, promote (over and above what may have been attained on the basis of the elimination of exchangerate uncertainty among separate currencies) reciprocal trade, economic and financial integration, and the accumulation of knowledge (Rose and Van Wincoop, 2001; Mongelli, 2002) 27 . These effects are said to increase the productivity of capital and labor and, therefore, to raise potential output (De Grauwe, 2002) . Additionally, increased trade integration is said to result in more highly-correlated business cycles because of common demand shocks and greater intra-industry trade, lessening the need of country-specific monetary policies (Frankel and Rose, 1998) .
2. Credibility. The earlier (i.e., circa 1970s and 1980s) literature on the merits of fixed exchange rates stressed the disciplining character of such regimes. Policy bias towards discipline was thought to be fostered for two primary reasons. First, the country's reserves are put on the line, and the quantity of such reserves is limited.
Second, the authorities who devalue are often considered to have failed in their macroeconomic management. The discipline hypothesis posited that an exchangerate commitment would help a high-inflation country attain a low-inflation equilibrium, but at a cost. Along the way to lower inflation, the country in question would experience the higher unemployment and lower output that derive from any restrictive policies 28 .
A major benefit ascribed to monetary unions in the more recent literature is the credibility gain derived from the elimination of the inflation-bias problem of discretionary monetary policy (Barro and Gordon, 1983) . This bias stems from two main sources: (1) Attempts to over-stimulate economies on average, and (2) incentives to monetise budget deficits and debt (Alesina and Barro, 2001:382) . This argument has often been used in support of currency boards or dollarisation for 27 Theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and trade has not uncovered a negative linkage. For a recent discussion, see Clark, Tamirisa, and Wei (2004) . 28 The earlier literature on OCAs treated the similarity of inflation rates between or among countries as a precondition for monetary union, the idea being that, if inflation rates between countries are similar, an equilibrated flow of current-account transactions is more likely to take place among these countries than when inflation rates are divergent (see Fleming, 1971; Ishiyama, 1975) .
economies that have had histories of relatively high inflation associated with profligate macroeconomic policies (e.g., Barro, 1999; Hausmann, 1999) 29 . If agents in the goods, labour, and foreign-exchange markets believe that the commitment to adopt a common currency is sustainable, so that it changes agents' expectations, the output and employment costs of attaining a low-inflation equilibrium are reduced.
Since there is no devaluation risk and, therefore, no need of an interest rate premium to cover the risk of devaluation, nominal and real interest rates are lower than otherwise. With low and stable inflation, and lower interest rates, economic horizons lengthen, encouraging a transformation of the financial sector, thereby promoting risk taking and stimulating private investment, fostering faster growth (Dornbusch, 2001) .
The above argument suggests that the benefits (in terms of importing credibility) of joining a common-currency area with a credible regional central bank can be substantial, even if a particular country's characteristics (such as openness, asymmetry of shocks, and labour-market flexibility) do not appear to be very favourable for monetary unification. 30 Additionally, the literature on credibility leads to the following inference with respect to the use of adjustments of exchange rates of national currencies: An exchange rate adjustment is not a flexible instrument that can be used frequently. Its present use affects its future effectiveness because it engenders strong expectational effects. Consequently, the benefits of using the instrument in the present need to be weighed against the costs of using the instrument in the future -i.e., the effectiveness of future adjustments is likely to diminish if adjustments in the present have been frequent and/or large (De Grauwe, 2007:52) .
Estimation approaches and results
Several empirical studies deal with either the endogeneity of trade and/or credibility within the specific context of southern African countries. Specifically, Masson and Pattillo (2005) and Carrere (2004) considered the effects of a common currency on 29 A related argument is that a pegged-rate system provides a nominal anchor in a disinflationary environment because of its effect on real money demand. If agents believe the disinflation policy associated with the peg is credible, interest rates fall so that the demand for real money balances rises and, for a given path of money growth, inflation falls. Because this argument applies to a limited set of circumstances, and because of the availability of alternative monetary rules that can provide a nominal anchor, the argument is not pursued here. For further discussion, see Stockman (1999) . 30 This argument has been used to explain the reasons that countries such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal benefited from euro-area membership.
intra-CMA trade and intra-SADC trade, respectively. Masson and Pattillo (2005) , Masson (2006) , and Guillaume-Stasavage (2000) considered the possible credibility gains attributable to a common currency. The approaches pursued by the authors of the studies and the results obtained are discussed in what follows.
Trade creation.
The workhorse model used in the empirical literature on the trade-creation effects of a common currency is the gravity model (see Rose, 2000) .
The gravity model is usually specified to include as explanatory variables the product of the real GDPs of two economies, in both level and per capita specifications, the distance between them, and the land area of the economies (Masson and Pattillo, 2005:54) . policy to which it subscribed (and agreed as a condition of supporting the executive)
were to be violated. Consequently, Guillaume and Stasavage argued that countries with relatively low levels of fractionalisation and/or relatively-strong executive branches are likely to be better candidates for monetary unions than countries with high levels of fractionalisation and/or weak executive branches since such unions would include regional central banks, making it more costly for those countries to renege on the rules. 34 Guillaume and Stasavage also considered measures of political shocks (i.e., number of coups, numbers of cabinet changes) to judge the suitability of monetary-union participation; the authors argued that countries with higher levels of political shocks would gain by the stability that could be provided by a regional central bank, which would be under less country-specific pressures to follow profligate policies.
Based on an analysis of the data on the above data, Guillaume and Stasavage policy to reflect the average economic conditions (e.g., fiscal balances) in the region, the potential losses (i.e., higher inflation) from giving up an existing credible national 34 The argument that broad coalitions make reneging on rules more costly can be criticised since, under broad coalitions, the costs of reneging can be spread out, making reneging more likely. 35 Guillaume and Stasavage's assessment pertained to monetary unions among African economies more generally. In light of the fact that the evidence on political variables presented by the authors for the SADC countries was similar to that presented for other African regions, the inference drawn with respect to Africa more generally seems to apply to the SADC countries.
central bank, relevant in the case of South Africa and the other CMA countries, could outweigh any potential benefits of trade creation resulting from a common currency.
The relatively small number of studies dealing with the endogeneity issue in the southern African context indicates, however, that more research is needed before anything approaching a definitive conclusion can be reached on the matter.
5
Concluding remarks
In addition to differences in empirical methodologies, countries considered, and (6) Although national policies can, to some extent, be used to deal with asymmetric shocks among the nations participating in a currency union, as the experience of the euro area has shown, the systematic use of this instrument can lead to problems of debt sustainability. The SADC approach to a monetary union is based on the principles of gradualism and conditionality. These principles must be applied strictly to ensure the viability of a southern African monetary union; endogeneity of the OCA criteria will help ameliorate some -but not all -asymmetries among southern African countries. 37 Masson and Patillo (2005) also argued that a monetary union in Southern Africa should be selective and based on the satisfaction of fiscal convergence criteria.
economic fundamentals, rather than at establishing a level for the exchange rate. In these regimes, monetary policy is in principle independent of exchange rate policy. Significant co-movement in real exchange rates indicated the existence of common trends so that underlying country-specific shocks and/or policy changes do not lead to diverging relative prices.
Carrere (2004) Shocks were found to be asymmetric (4 of 6 correlations were negative). 
